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In this paper we model the market for a homogeneous good and examine the role of
information in determining market outcomes. Unlike in Baye and Morgan (2001) where
consumers can only learn about the prices charged by di⁄erent ￿rms by subscribing to
an information intermediary￿ s service, we allow consumers to shop for price quotes. We
are interested in determing the impact on market outcomes of allowing for this additional
means of information acquisition. Relative to the case where consumers have no interest
in searching for prices, consumers become no better o⁄ as the cost of search falls. The
intermediary, in an e⁄ort to compensate for the loss of revenue that it might have earned
from consumers, increases the fees that it charges to ￿rms for the right to advertise their
product through it. As a result, fewer ￿rms advertise in equilibrium, and so, those that
do post higher prices, and, in expectation, consumers pay more for the product. The
price increase appropriates all of the gains in consumer surplus generated by the decrease
in the cost of search.
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Baye and Morgan (2001) examine the impact on product market outcomes of information
gatekeepers on the internet. They argue that modern communication has lowered the mar-
ginal cost of acquiring and transmitting information and impacted the competitiveness of
markets. In their set up, ￿rms decide whether to advertise their price through the internet
gatekeeper in exchange for a fee. Gatekeepers such as Mortgagequotes.com and Expedia.com
allow consumers, should they choose to become members of their websites, easy access to a
list of prices charged by di⁄erent ￿rms.
In the Baye and Morgan model, each ￿rm is located in a geographically separate town
and it is assumed that travel costs are su¢ ciently important that consumers living in one
town will not visit the store in another. In other words, search costs are high enough that
consumers who do not access the gatekeeper￿ s website have no other way to learn about the
prices charged by ￿rms other than their local provider.
But in fact it is often the case that searching for prices is not prohibitively expensive. In
cities of even modest size, many ￿rms will have bricks and mortar outlets and so consumers
may be able to visit multiple stores as they search for price quotes. Moreover, although they
may choose to post their prices on the sites of internet gatekeepers, many ￿rms also have
websites of their own on which they announce the prices that they charge. And therefore
search may not be that costly.
In this paper we examine the impact on market outcomes of allowing for this additional
means of information acquisition. We suppose that consumers can learn about ￿rm prices
either by subscribing to the intermediary￿ s service and viewing the advertisements of ￿rms
that post them with the intermediary, or by visiting individual stores. The intermediary
can be thought of as an internet gatekeeper, an infomediary, a newspaper, or any other
information clearinghouse.
As in Baye and Morgan we model the market for a homogeneous product. In a ￿rst stage,
an advertising intermediary maximizes pro￿ts by choosing both a fee to charge consumers to
view prices on its site and a fee to charge ￿rms to advertise through it. In a second stage, the
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via the intermediary. Finally, in a third stage, consumers shop. They decide whether to
subscribe to the intermediary and/or whether to engage in search, and they decide from
which seller to buy.
Baye and Morgan show that the intermediary sets its consumer subscription fee su¢ ciently
low that all consumers subscribe to its service, and earns its revenue by charging the ￿rms
a positive advertising fee. There is price dispersion in the product market. There is some
positive probability that ￿rms will not advertise, in which case they will charge the maximum
consumer willingness to pay. If they advertise, they draw from a price distribution.
Once search is added to the model, enticing consumers to subscribe to its service becomes
more di¢ cult for the intermediary. We show that, despite this, the intermediary will set
subscription fees such that all consumers subscribe, but that, compared to Baye and Morgan,
this fee must be lower. Essentially search represents an alternative means of information
acquisition and so acts as competition for the intermediary. It must lower the fee it charges
if it hopes to attract consumers.
Given this one would expect consumers to always be better o⁄ when they are able to
search for prices. We show that this is not the case. Relative to the case where consumers
have no interest in searching for prices (since search costs are high), consumers become no
better o⁄ as the cost of search falls (locally). This is because the intermediary, in an e⁄ort to
compensate for the loss of revenue that it might have earned from consumers, increases the
fees that it charges to ￿rms for the right to advertise their product through it. As a result,
fewer ￿rms choose to advertise in equilibrium, and so those that do advertise post higher
prices, and in expectation, consumers pay a higher price for the product. Essentially, the
price increase appropriates all of the gains in consumer surplus generated by the decrease in
the subscription fee.
So in equilibrium, unless the cost of search is very low, consumers are no better o⁄ when
they can search. The information intermediary is worse o⁄ since its gain in pro￿ts from the
increased advertising fee is never su¢ cient to cover the loss from the lowering of the consumer
3subscription fee. Firms are better o⁄.
Our paper is closely related to Robert and Stahl (1993) in that in both models consumers
are a priori uninformed as to the prices o⁄ered by ￿rms and can learn about prices either by
engaging in search, or by observing price advertisements from ￿rms. However, in their model,
the costs of sending and acquiring information are exogenous. Advertising in their model is
not done through an advertising intermediary, or at least not one that behaves strategically.
Firms, should they choose to advertise, send their messages directly to consumers in order to
inform those viewing the ads of their price. We show that it is precisely the reaction by the
intermediary to consumers￿ability to search that determines the e⁄ect of search on welfare.
More generally our paper is related to the literatures on search and on price advertis-
ing. In the search literature (see for example, Stigler (1961), Rothschild (1973), Reinganum
(1979), Stahl (1989)) consumers search for price information and incur a cost for each addi-
tional price quote. The price advertising literature includes papers in which consumers are
targeted directly by ￿rms (see for example Butters (1977), Grossman and Shapiro (1984),
Stahl (1994)), and papers in which consumers can access price quotes through newspapers
or internet gatekeepers (see for example Salop and Stiglitz (1977), Shilony (1977), Varian
(1980)).
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we introduce the model. In
Section 3 we characterize equilibrium behavior. In Section 4 we examine the e⁄ect of search
on equilibrium outcomes. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
The model we set up is related to Baye and Morgan (2001) and to Robert and Stahl (1993).
Relative to Baye and Morgan, in our set up consumers are allowed to engage in search.
Relative to Robert and Stahl, an information intermediary is added such that the costs of
acquiring and disseminating information are endogenized.
A ￿nite number, n, of ￿rms sell a homogeneous good. The cost of producing a unit
of the good is assumed to be constant and the same for all ￿rms, and for simplicity the
4marginal cost is normalized to be zero. There is a continuum of consumers of measure one,






Consumers are a priori aware of ￿rms but uninformed as to the prices of the goods they
o⁄er for sale. There are two methods for them to learn about prices. The ￿rst is through
sequential search at a cost of " per ￿rm visited. The second is by viewing a ￿rm￿ s advertisement
which indicates its price. We assume that advertising can only be done through a single
intermediary that acts as an information provider. The information intermediary can be
thought of as an information clearinghouse (internet gatekeeper, newspaper, etc). Consumers
can search for prices, and/or can pay a subscription fee, ￿, to access the intermediary￿ s service.
Subscribing to the service allows consumers to observe the price quotes of advertising ￿rms,
and so to determine the lowest advertised price. The search cost of " should be interpreted
as the cost of visiting a ￿rm either virtually or physically. Even consumers that obtain a
favorable price quote via the intermediary must pay " to visit the low-price store and acquire
the good. We also assume free recall and so if, after visiting other stores, a consumer wishes
to purchase from a store that he visited earlier, he can do so at no extra cost.
Firms can advertise their price through the intermediary for a fee ￿. We denote the pro￿ts
earned from a consumer that pays price p as ￿(p) = pq(p): We assume that ￿(￿) is globally
concave and that there is a unique pro￿t maximizing price r. We assume that S(r) ￿ ", so
consumers are willing to visit at less one store in order to purchase a good at price r.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the ￿rst stage, the information intermediary selects
fees, ￿ and ￿, to charge consumers and ￿rms respectively. In the second stage, consumers
decide whether they wish to subscribe to the intermediary￿ s network. We denote by ￿, the
proportion of consumers that choose to subscribe. In this stage the ￿rms also simultaneously
choose their price and whether or not to advertise this price through the intermediary. In a
￿nal stage, consumers who subscribe to the intermediary observe price quotes from ￿rms that
have chosen to advertise. Consumers may choose to purchase from the low-price advertising
￿rm, or they may at that point choose to engage in sequential search among ￿rms until they
5￿nd a more acceptable price quote.
3 Equilibrium Behavior
We are interested in characterizing the (perfect Bayesian) symmetric equilibria of this game.
In order to characterize equilibrium outcomes, we proceed by backward induction. First, we
describe the consumers￿shopping behavior including the search rules used by subscribers and
non-subscribers respectively. Next, we describe the pricing and advertising strategies of ￿rms
and the subscription decision of consumers given the intermediary￿ s fees ￿ and ￿. Typically,
￿rms will employ a mixed strategy in their pricing which generates a price distribution.
Finally, we characterize the optimal strategy for the intermediary.
3.1 Consumer shopping behavior
We begin by characterizing the shopping behavior of consumers. To do so we must characterize
two di⁄erent price distributions. We let F(p) denote the probability that a ￿rm charges a price
strictly less than p; and we let H(p) denote the probability that a ￿rm charges and advertises a
price strictly less than p.1 We assume that both F(￿) and H(￿) are left-continuous. Consusmer
shopping rules will depend on these two distributions.
We ￿rst consider the shopping strategy of non-subscribers. Since they do not see any
advertisements, the only way for consumers to learn about the prices charged by particular
￿rms is through costly search. If consumers engage in search, they draw from the distribution
F at a cost of " per draw. Suppose that a consumer is in a store that charges b p, he can either
accept b p, or reject it and continue on with his search. If he does, he will su⁄er another search
cost "; and draw a new price. Consumers will continue to search if their surplus from price




S(y)dF(y) + S(b p)[1 ￿ F(b p)] ￿ ":
[1 ￿ F(b p)] corresponds to the probability that the new draw yields a price equal to or higher
than b p. Otherwise the consumer draws some new price less than b p. Rearranging and inte-
1We use ￿ strictly less than￿rather than the conventional ￿ less than or equal to￿in order to avoid problems
arising due to mass points at the search reservation prices de￿ned below.
6grating by parts, we can rewrite the above expression as
Z b p
0




So the optimal strategy is to search until a price quote is obtained at or below the reservation




This is the search rule so long as there are still stores from which the consumer still does not
have a price quote. If the consumer has all price information, he simply goes to the store
with the lowest price.
Note that if " is su¢ ciently high then rs ￿ r, and there will be no search at all. In this
case our model resembles Baye and Morgan. Otherwise, the possibility of search will have an
impact on consumer behavior.
Next we consider the search rule for subscribers. We let ￿ denote the probability that a
store advertises in equilibrium and we let T(p) denote the probability that a store charges





Subscribers may receive advertisements. If they do, one must ask under what condition
they will accept to spend " to visit the store advertising the best price rather than to search
through non-advertising ￿rms. Suppose a subscriber has seen an ad via the intermediary for a
price of b p. One option for the subscriber is to accept this quote and get surplus of S(b p) minus
"since he must now visit the ￿rm. Let us denote by e p the price such that S(e p) = S(b p) ￿ ":
In other words, e p is the price that yields equivalent net utility to having b p without having to
pay to travel to the store advertising this price. The alternative to accepting e p is to reject
it and continue on with search. If he does, he will su⁄er another search cost "; and draw a
new price. Subsribers will continue to search if their surplus from price e p is less than their




S(y)dT(y) + S(e p)[1 ￿ T(b p)] ￿ ": (1)
7We denote by rm the price where (1) holds with equality. That is, rm is the search
reservation price for a subsriber. if a subscriber sees rm or less once at a store, he will accept




S(y)dT(y) + S(rm)[1 ￿ T(rm)] ￿ "
It follows that a subscriber will accept to pay " to visit store that charges p ￿ ra, where
S(ra) ￿ " = S(rm). Because ￿rms never charges prices above r, we have that ra ￿ r.
3.2 Firm pricing and advertising behavior
Firm behavior depends on the proportion of the population that are subscribers of the inter-
mediary￿ s network, ￿. For small values of ￿, the proportion of non-subscribers is su¢ ciently
high that ￿rms will never charge a price above the non-subscriber￿ s reservation price, rs. As
the proportion of subscribers increases, it becomes pro￿table to charge higher prices. When
￿ = 1, there will be a mass point in the price distribution at the monopoly price, r. We
begin our analysis by describing the ￿rm￿ s strategy when ￿ = 1, i.e. when all consumers
are subscribers of the intermediary￿ s network and have access to the price advertisements of
￿rms. We do this, for two reasons. The ￿rst is expositional in that the description of the
pricing and advertising equilibrium is relatively straightforward when ￿ = 1. Second, we
show later in the paper that the symmetric equilibrium that generates the highest pro￿t for
the intermediary involves full consumer participation (￿ = 1). It is useful, therefore, to focus
on this case.
3.2.1 Firm behavior when ￿ = 1
When ￿ = 1, the description of the ￿rms￿ equilibrium behavior is straightforward. We
have the following (i) if the advertising fee is too high, ￿rms will never advertise and they
will always charge the monopoly price; (ii) if the advertising fee is not too high, ￿rms will
sometimes advertise and there will be an equilibrium price distribution, (iii) there will be a
mass point at the top of the price distribution, (iv) the mass point will necessarily be at the
monopoly price r, and all quotes for prices less than r will be advertised; (v) below r, the
price distribution will have no mass points nor gaps. Formally, we can state the following:
8Lemma 1 When ￿ = 1, if ￿ ￿
(n￿1)￿(r)
n , ￿rms never advertise and always charge the
monopoly price, r. If ￿ <
(n￿1)￿(r)
n , the following characterizes the unique symmetric equi-
librium strategy:
(i) Firms advertise if and only if they charge a price strictly less than r.
(ii) The equilibrium pro￿t accruing to each ￿rm, ￿f, is given by
￿
(n￿1):
(iii) For all prices in the support of the distribution, p 2 [pmin;r]; we have:







where pmin is such that ￿(pmin) =
n￿
n￿1:





Proof. Let pmax be the highest price ever charged in equilibrium and let ￿ denote the
probability that a ￿rm advertises. Clearly, a ￿rm will never advertise when charging
price pmax, since it would reveal to consumers that it charges the highest possible price.
Also pmax ￿ r, since it never pays to o⁄er a price above the monopoly price. The








Where ￿f represents equilibrium pro￿ts and [1 ￿ ￿]
n￿1denotes the probability that all
other ￿rms do not advertise. Recall that if no ￿rm advertises, each ￿rm gets 1
nth of
the market. Now, notice that all prices charged below pmax must be advertised. If a
￿rm charges less than pmax but does not advertise, it will attract consumers with the
same probability but earn less because ￿(p) < ￿(pmax). It follows that ￿ = F(pmax).
Since the only price charged by those not advertising is pmax, we have ra = pmax. Also
we must have pmax = r. Indeed, suppose that pmax < r, then a ￿rm can deviate and
charge a higher price p that will yield higher pro￿ts (i.e. ￿(p) > ￿(pmax)) and that will
be acceptable to consumers (i.e. S(p) > S(pmax) + "). This establishes (i).
9Now consider the expected pro￿ts for a ￿rm that chooses to charge p and to advertise
it with the intermediary. The probability that this ￿rm attracts all consumers is given
by the probability that all other ￿rms charge more than p. Notice that for prices below
r, there cannot be a positive probability of a tie. If there were a positive probability
of a tie, a ￿rm could o⁄er a slightly lower price, break the tie in its favor and make
strictly more pro￿t. Hence, we have:
￿f = ￿(p)[1 ￿ F(p)]
n￿1 ￿ ￿: (4)
[1 ￿ F(p)]
n￿1 is the probability that no other ￿rm advertises a price lower than p







= ￿(r)[1 ￿ F(r)]












This establishes (ii) in Lemma 1. We can now solve for the distribution of prices, F(p).
We have:







where the minimum price, pmin, is such that F(pmin;￿) = 0, or ￿(pmin) =
n￿
(n￿1):






Notice that for ￿rms to be willing to actually advertise and charge less than r with some
probability, we must have F(r) > 0 or




So this condition is necessary to have an equilibrium in which ￿rms advertise through the
intermediary.
103.2.2 Firm behavior when ￿ < 1
When ￿ < 1, the complete characterization of the ￿rms￿equilibrium strategies is quite cum-
bersome. For expositional purposes, we simply provide an overview of what the strategies
look like and we present the di⁄erent possible equilibrium con￿gurations. We do this below,
but ￿rst we state some general results for the cases where ￿ < 1:
Lemma 2 Suppose that ￿ < 1, then we have the following:
(i) Firms always advertise prices tendered below rs and H(rs) = F(rs):
(ii) There are no mass point above or below rs.
(iii) The probability that a ￿rm charging p sells to a subscriber is given by:
(
[1 ￿ H(p)]
n￿1 , if p is advertised and p ￿ ra
[1￿￿]n￿1
n , if p is not advertised
(iv) Let ￿ be the probability that a store charges rs or less, then the probability that a ￿rm









n , if p ￿ rs
(v) If there is a mass point at rs, then price rs is not advertised in equilibrium.
(vi) There is always a range of prices (rs;r0) where rs < r0, which are never charged in
equilibrium.
(vii) Firms will never advertise prices above ra, or o⁄er prices above rm ￿ r.
(viii) If ra > r0, then all prices between r0 and ra are advertised with some probability.
Proof. (i) Suppose that a ￿rm charges a price less than rs but does not advertise this price.
It will not attract more non-subscribers than if it instead charged rs(non-subscribers
would accept rs anyway) or more subscribers (since it does not advertise). Therefore,
11the ￿rm makes strictly less pro￿t than it would by charging rs and not advertising.
Hence we have H(rs) = F(rs).
(ii) If a ￿rm charges some price p > rs, it will sell to the non-subscribers only if all other
stores charge p or more. In this case, non-subscribers will visit all the stores and will
in the end purchase from the store o⁄ering the lowest price. If there is a mass point in
the symmetric price distribution above rs, there will be a strict probability of a tie at
that price and ￿rms will have incentive to deviate and o⁄er a marginally smaller price
in order to break the tie. Similarly, because all prices below are advertised, a mass
point below rs will lead to a strict probability of a tie among ￿rms seeking to attract
subscribers. Hence, a mass point cannot exist.
(iii) If a seller advertises some price p ￿ ra, it will attract all subscribers if and only if
none of the other ￿rms advertise a lower price. This occurs with probability [1 ￿ ￿]
n￿1.
If a seller does not advertise, it will attract 1
nth of subscribers if and only if all the other
sellers do not advertise a price less than ra.
(iv) If a seller charges p > rs, it will sell to the non-subscribers only if all other ￿rms
charge p or greater. This occurs with probability [1 ￿ F(p)]
n￿1. Now suppose that the
store charges p < rs and it is the ith store in a particular consumer￿ s search itinerary.
The store will sell to that consumer with probability [1 ￿ ￿]
i￿1, i.e. only if all stores
visited earlier according to the consumer search itinerary charge strictly more than rs.
Because there is probability of 1
n of being the ith store in a consumer￿ s itinerary for all
i, the probability of selling to a non-subscriber when charging p < rs is indeed given by
the expression in the Lemma.
(v) If price rs is advertised with positive probability and there is a mass point at rs,
there is a strictly positive probability of a tie. This cannot be the case.
(vi) Consider a price p marginally above rs. Because non-subscribers do not imme-
diately accept p but do accept rs, the probability of selling at price p is strictly less
than of selling at rs. So there are values of p su¢ ciently close to rs for which pro￿ts
12are strictly less than those earned from charging rs. These prices are not charged in
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Note that this notation allows for a mass point at rs which is expressed by probability
F(r0_ ) ￿ F(rs) ￿ 0.
(vi) Consumers prefer to go to a non-advertising ￿rm than to go to a seller charging
p > ra and advertising. Hence, it never pays to advertise prices above ra. Suppose
that p > rm is the highest price charged in equilibrium. Because there is no mass point
above rs and consumers will never accept to pay a price above rm unless they have
searched all stores, the probability that the store sells is zero. rm is the highest price
charged in equilibrium.
(vii) Suppose that r0 < ra but that the highest (supremum) price advertised in equilib-
rium is some price p < ra. We have H(p) = ￿. Also at price p a seller will be indi⁄erent





= ￿(p)￿[1 ￿ ￿]
n￿1 ￿ ￿:
But if this is true for some price p < ra, then for all p0 2 (p;ra), the seller will strictly
prefer to advertise its price. This contradicts the assumption that no price above p is
advertised. This completes our proof.
When ￿ < 1, the equilibrium is de￿ned by a vector of threshold prices rs < r0 and r1 ￿
ra < rm ￿ r. The value r0 is the lowest price above rs that yields the same pro￿t as charging







The threshold prices ra and rm are given by the subscribers￿shopping rules. Finally r1 is the
13highest value for which H (r1) = F(r1). The structure of the equilibrium will depend on the
value of r0 relative to r1;ra and rm. There will be four di⁄erent cases:
Case A: If r0 ￿ rm; in equilibrium the highest price charged is rs and non-subscribers
never engage in search. We have F(r0) = 1, and there will be a mass point at price rs. Only



















￿ ￿ for p < rs: (9)
For this to constitute an equilibrium, we must verify that ￿rms cannot gain by charging
more than rs. Suppose that a store charges a price p > rs. Conditional on not observing
an ad, subscribers will believe that all stores charge rs. Hence, so long as p ￿ rm, we have
S(p) ￿ S(rs) ￿ " and subscribers that have not observed an advertisement and have arrived
in the store through search will accept to pay price p. So long as r0 ￿ rm; there will exist no
p ￿ rm that will generate higher pro￿ts for the ￿rms.
The condition r0 ￿ rm implies that in Case A the proportion ￿ is su¢ ciently small that
￿rms prefer not to charge above rs and attract only subscribers.
Case B: If rm > r0 > ra, the prices between rm and r0 will be chosen by ￿rms in
equilibrium, but they will not be advertised. There must a mass point at rs, and rs is not





n￿1 < F(r0) < F(rm) = 1.
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n￿1
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￿ ￿ for p < rs















> S(r0) ￿ " (10)
Case C: If rm > ra > r0 > r1, the prices between rm and ra will be charged in equilibrium
but not advertised. The prices between r0 and ra, will only sometimes be advertised. Finally
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￿ ￿, for p < rs
Because there can be no mass point at the top of the distribution, we have F(rm) = 1. So
from above we can obtain the following condition on the distributions H(p) and F(p). From


































15One can verify that F(p) > H(p) if and only if p > r1, where r1 denotes the price such
that:
(1 ￿ ￿)(n ￿ 1)￿(ra) + ￿(r1) = ￿￿(rm): (17)
Hence, if r0 > r1, we have F(r0) > H(r0), and there must be a mass point a rs.
Case D: If rm > ra > r1 > r0, prices above ra are never advertised, prices between ra
and r1 are advertised with some probability and all prices below r1 are always advertised.
We have F(r1) = H(r1) and there is no mass point at rs (F(rs) = F(r0)).
When ￿ converges to 1, we are in case D. One can verify from (17) that the threshold
prices r1 and ra converge to r and there is no mass point at rs. Also from (7), one can verify
that r0 converges to rs.
To summarize, the description and computation of the equilibrium when ￿ < 1 is complex.
For some values of ￿ < 1, we have active search by non-subscribers, and a mass point in the
price distribution.
3.3 The consumer subscription decision
The consumer￿ s subscription decision will depend on the comparison between ￿, the subscrip-
tion fee charged by the information intermediary, and the bene￿t to a consumer of becoming
a subscriber. Let UNSub(￿;￿) and USub(￿;￿) denote the expected utility of a non-subscriber
and subscriber respectively when there is a proportion ￿ of consumers subscribed and the
advertising fee is ￿.
Lemma 3 Given ￿ and ￿ chosen by the intermediary, ￿￿ is an equilibrium proportion of
subscribers if and only if:
(i) ￿￿ = 1 and ￿ ￿ USub(1;￿) ￿ UNSub(1;￿).
(ii) ￿￿ = 0 and ￿ ￿ USub(0;￿) ￿ UNSub(0;￿).
(iii) ￿￿ 2 (0;1) and ￿ = USub(￿￿;￿) ￿ UNSub(￿￿;￿).
16The result is immediate and a formal proof is omitted. Note that there is always an
equilibrium with ￿￿ = 0 when ￿ ￿ 0. Indeed, when ￿￿ = 0, ￿rms never advertise and they
always charge r and there is no bene￿t of becoming a subscriber and USub(0;￿)￿UNSub(0;￿) =
0. When ￿￿ 2 (0;1), consumers must be indi⁄erent between becoming subscribers or not.
We are interested in an equilibrium with advertising and so in order to better understand
the impact of ￿ and ￿ on consumer welfare, we need to compute more precisely UNSub(￿;￿);
the expected utility of a non-subscriber and USub(￿;￿); the expected utility of a subscriber.
The follow lemma (proven in the appendix) summarizes the main result of this subsection.
Lemma 4 Let F(:;￿;￿) denote the equilibrium distribution of prices for given ￿ and ￿, and





rs(￿;￿) q(y)(1 ￿ [1 ￿ F(y;￿;￿)]
n)dy
￿
, if rs(￿;￿) < r
S(r) +
R r
0 q(y)F(y;￿;￿)dy ￿ ", if rs(￿;￿) = r
(18)
USub(￿;￿) ￿ S(r) +
￿Z r
0




And eq.19 holds with equality when ￿ = 1.
From the above Lemma we can set a bound on the di⁄erence between subscriber and
non-subscriber welfare and so for the value of the subscription fee that the information inter-
mediary can charge consumers


















Revenue for the intermediary comes from two sources: the advertising fees charged to ￿rms
and the subscription fees charged to consumers. The probability that a ￿rm advertises is given
by H(r;￿;￿) and so the revenues from advertising fees are n￿H(r;￿;￿). The subscription
fee is set so that it equals USub(￿;￿) ￿ UNSub(￿;￿), i.e. consumers are indi⁄erent between
17subscribing or not. The intermediary￿ s pro￿ts are given by
￿I(￿;￿) = n￿H(r;￿;￿) + ￿[USub(￿;￿) ￿ UNSub(￿;￿)]: (21)
Proposition 1 Among the possible symmetric equilibria, the pro￿t of the intermediary is
maximized when the following holds:
(i) The subscription fee is such that all consumers subscribe to the intermediary￿ s service,
i.e. ￿ = 1.































































The proof of part (i) of this proposition is cumbersome and therefore delegated to the
appendix. The main idea is that for all ￿ < 1 there exists a ￿￿, such that for any ￿;
￿I(￿;￿) < ￿I(1;￿￿). Therefore, it is never optimal to set ￿ < 1: The rest of the proposition
follows immediately from the previous discussion. We have replaced F(:) by the equation
given by (??).
4 E⁄ect of Search on Equilibrium Behavior
Now that we have described equilibrium behavior we would like to determine the e⁄ect of
allowing consumers to search on equilibrium outcomes. To do so we ￿rst characterize the
18search cost that is such that it is not worthwhile for consumers to search. This occurs when
the reserve price of consumers is equal to the monopoly price.
Proposition 2 There exists a search cost, "ns, such that for all " > "ns, the optimal adver-
tising fee is ￿ns, and rs(￿ns;") = r so that search is not worthwhile for consumers.




is such that "ns is the lowest value of " such
that the reserve price of consumers is equal to r: Moreover, for all search costs " > "ns
the increase in the cost of search (over "ns) does not directly a⁄ect the intermediary pro￿t
function and so ￿ns will always be the optimal advertising fee.
We next characterize what happens to the optimal advertising fee as the cost of search
converges to zero. At ￿ns and for " > "ns, revenue from advertising is increasing in ￿, while
revenue from consumer subscription is decreasing in ￿. At the optimum, there is an arbitrage
between increasing advertising revenues and increasing revenue from subscription. When the
cost of search converges to zero, this arbitrage disappears. Intuitively, when search costs are
low, the intermediary will decrease the subscription fees for consumers in order to guarantee
that all of them decide to use its service. In order to be compensated for the loss incurred
from these lower subscription fees, it increases the advertising fee. In the limit, when search
is costless, the reserve price for searchers, rs, is equal to the minimum price (pmin) and so,
from eq. (22), the optimal subscription fee is equal to zero. In this case, the intermediary
charges the advertising fee, ￿0, that maximizes advertising revenues.







which is greater than ￿ns:
Although we do not show that ￿ increases for all small decreases in the cost of search
(this would require more restrictions on the shape of the demand function), Proposition 3
implies that, globally, as the cost of search falls towards 0, the advertising fee charged by
19the intermediary increases. Increasing ￿ has a number of important e⁄ects on equilibrium
outcomes, which we summarize in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 In equilibrium, as " decreases and ￿ increases,
1. the probability that a ￿rm advertises, F(r;￿); decreases.
2. the probability that a subscriber observes an advertisement, (1￿ [1 ￿ F(r;￿)]
n) de-
creases.
3. expected ￿rm pro￿ts, ￿f; increase.
4. the price range becomes more narrow (so pmin is larger) and ￿rms charge higher prices
(stochastically).
5. the expected intermediary pro￿ts, ￿I; decrease.
By decreasing the cost of search, the intermediary increases the advertising fee for ￿rms
which lowers their propensity to advertise through it. Consequently the probability that a
consumer observes an advertisement also falls.
The increase in the cost of search (and associated increase in the advertising fee) has two
opposing e⁄ects on ￿rm pro￿ts. On the one hand, the cost of advertising is now higher. On
the other, the bene￿t of advertising is also greater. Competition is reduced since fewer ￿rms
will choose to advertise through the intermediary, and consequently those that do choose to
advertise can post higher prices and have a higher probability of being the lowest advertised
price. The second e⁄ect dominates and so ￿rms￿pro￿ts increase with the advertising fee.
For the intermediary, expected pro￿ts fall as the cost of search decreases. The increase in
the advertising fee it charges to ￿rms in order to advertise will compensate it only partially
for the loss it incurs from decreasing ￿ in order to encourage consumers to subscribe to its
service. This is because the intermediary cannot a⁄ord to signi￿cantly increase advertising
fees for fear of alienating ￿rms.
Now that we have shown what happens globally, we can investigate what happens as the
cost of search decreases below "ns. That is, we can determine what happens locally as search
20becomes interesting for consumers. We show in the following proposition that if the cost
of search decreases in a neighborhood below "ns, consumers will be no better o⁄ than they
were at "ns. The intuition for this surprising result is that all of the bene￿ts from search
are appropriated by the ￿rms through higher prices. If the intermediary were to hold the
advertising fee, ￿, constant, the decrease in " would make the outside option for consumers
more attractive and force the intermediary to make subscription more a⁄ordable (by lowering
￿). In order to avoid this, the intermediary can increase ￿. This shifts the price distribution
(￿rst order stochastic dominance) and reduces the incentive to search. The net result is that
the increase in ￿ will o⁄set the reduction in the cost of search and so despite the lower search
cost, non-members will still not want engage in search.







Furthermore, for all " 2 [b ";"ns], a decrease in the cost of search is o⁄set by an increase in ￿￿
and therefore in expected prices, and so the ability to search does not make consumers better
o⁄ in equilibrium.
For all " 2 [b ";"ns], consumers are not a⁄ected by the existence of search possibility since
their expected pro￿t is always equal to S(r): Indeed we have:





￿ " = S(r)
When " 2 [b ";"ns], the intermediary￿ s optimal strategy is to make non-subscribers just in-
di⁄erent between search and not searching at the monopoly price. The bene￿t from this
alternative source of price information is captured by the intermediary and by the ￿rms since
the intermediary will maintain this equilibrium by increasing advertising fees and expected
prices.
Proposition 5 implies that consumers may not be better o⁄ when they are allowed to
search. In fact, if we distinguish between the cost of visit the ￿rst store (call this cost "f)
21and the cost of visiting subsequent stores (call this cost "s), consumers may actually be worse
o⁄ when the cost of search falls far enough that search becomes interesting for consumers.
One reason to distinguish between these two costs is that in some cases, visiting the ￿rst
story may indeed be more costly than visiting subsequent stores. There may be a ￿xed cost
associated with going to the shopping mall or with opening one￿ s computer and browser.
More importantly, from a strategic point of view, these two costs are quite di⁄erent. Visiting
the ￿rst store represents a sunk cost for ￿rms. That is, in order to acquire a product, the
consumer must show up at a store. Although it appears in the welfare function of consumers,
the cost of visiting the ￿rst store has no strategic impact on consumers or on the intermediary.
In contrast, the cost of visiting subsequent stores does have a strategic impact. It is this cost,
"s, that will determine the search behavior of consumers and, by extension, their membership
fee. So if we make the distinction between "f and "s, Proposition 5 implies for all "s 2 [b ";"ns],
we have:
USub(￿￿) ￿ ￿(￿￿) = UNSub(￿￿) = S(r) + "s ￿ "f
In this case, if "s decreases more than "f, the consumers￿welfare actually decreases with a
reduction of search costs.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the market for a homogeneous good and considered the role
of information in determining market outcomes. In contrast with Baye and Morgan (2001) we
allow consumers to learn about price quotes by visiting the individual stores ￿be they virtual
or physical ￿of ￿rms as well by subscribing to the services of an information intermediary.
We show that despite the fact that an alternative source of price information exists for
consumers, allowing for search may not increase their welfare. When consumers are able to
search for price quotes, the intermediary￿ s pro￿t decreases since it must lower its consumer
subscription fee. In an e⁄ort to maintain revenue it increases the fee it charges ￿rms to adver-
tise, but can never increase it enough to compensate for the loss of revenue from subscription
22fees. Firms make up for higher advertising fees by increasing their prices, and their expected
pro￿ts increase. So consumers pay a lower subscription fee, but ￿rms appropriate all of this
increase in surplus by increasing their prices.
This paper extends Robert and Stahl (1993) by making the advertising fee endogenous.
By doing so, we obtain a surprising result. The idea that lower search costs will necessary
bene￿t consumers and lead to lower expected prices does not necessarily hold. The e⁄ect
of search on consumer welfare depends on how the information provider reacts to search.
In our model, the information intermediary has strong market power and uses its power to
extract maximal rents. This may lead to a higher advertising fee and less competition when
consumers￿search costs decreases. If the market for information intermediation were more
competitive, the results might be di⁄erent. For instance suppose that the intermediation
market is opened up to competition and that there exists a ￿xed cost to enter. With this
set up equilibrium intermediation pro￿ts should always equal the entry cost. In this case a
reduction in consumer search costs may simply cause some intermediaries to exit the market
resulting in little or no e⁄ect on the advertising fee. The goal of our paper has been to
introduce search into the Baye and Morgan framework. Extending the model to allow for
competing intermediaries is a topic for future research.
6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4
We need to consider two cases: One where rs = r, ie. (
R r
0 q(y)F(y;￿;￿)dy ￿ "), and one
where rs < r. In the former, since non-subscribers never search, they will pay whatever price












S(y)d(1 ￿ [1 ￿ F(y;￿;￿)]





q(y)(1 ￿ [1 ￿ F(y;￿;￿)]
n)dy ￿ " (24)
Now, consider the case where non-subscribers will visit stores until they ￿nd one that o⁄ers
a price less than or equal to rs < r. If no ￿rm o⁄ers a price less than or equal to rs; the
consumer will continue searching until he has visited all ￿rms and will purchase from the
one o⁄ering the lowest price. Let ￿ denote the probability that a ￿rm o⁄ers a price less or
equal rs. Because there can be a mass point at rs, we have to ￿ ￿ F(rs;￿;￿). The expected

































The ￿rst part of this expression is the welfare from receiving an o⁄er below rs at the ith ￿rm
visited. The second part represents the welfare from never receiving an o⁄er below rs and








































24One can verify that the optimal search rule implies that the second term is equal to 0, hence
we have:
UNSub(￿;￿) = S(r) +
 Z r
rs(￿;￿)




Similarly, we can set an upper bound on the welfare of subscribers. At best, subscribers
will be able to observe all prices charged by ￿rms and they will be able to purchase from
the store o⁄ering the lowest price in the market. in particular, this will occur when ￿ = 1.
Indeed if ￿ = 1, ￿rms will advertise if and only if they charge less than r and subscribers
will be able to observe any price less than r. Hence, eq. (19) corresponds to an upper bound
for USub(￿;￿) which holds with equality when ￿ = 1.
Proof of Theorem 1(i):
We wish to prove that for all ￿ < 1 and ￿, there exists a ￿￿, such that ￿I(￿;￿) < ￿I(1;￿￿)
and hence, it is never optimal to set ￿ < 1: Let ￿f(￿;￿) denote the equilibrium pro￿t of the
￿rm for some ￿ and ￿ and let ￿(￿;￿) denote the probability that a ￿rm advertises for some
￿ and ￿. From the discussion in Section 3, we have the following:
































































For Case A (rs is the highest price charged in equilibrium), we select some advertising fee
￿￿ =
￿
￿ > ￿. Note that ￿(￿;￿) ￿ ￿(1;￿￿). It follows that n￿￿￿(1;￿￿) ￿ n￿￿(￿;￿).
For the Cases B, C and D (i.e. when there is a price rm > rs , which is charged
in equilibrium and which is not advertised), we choose some advertising fee ￿￿ such that





= ￿f(￿;￿) + ￿. In Case B, we set ￿￿ =
[￿(rm)+(n￿1)￿(rs)]
n￿(rs) ￿ ￿ ￿,
25in Cases C and D, we set ￿￿ =
[￿(rm)+(n￿1)￿(ra)]
n￿(ra) ￿ ￿ ￿. Again we can show that ￿(￿;￿) ￿































A similar argument applies for Cases C and D. Again we have n￿￿￿(1;￿￿) ￿ n￿￿(￿;￿).
We now show that revenue from subscription is also higher with ￿ = 1, i.e. ￿￿(￿;￿) <






































F(y) = 1 ￿ F(y) ￿ [1 ￿ F(y)]
n
= [1 ￿ F(y)]
￿


















We now state the following lemma.
Lemma 5 Suppose that [1 ￿ F(p;1;￿￿)]
n￿1 ￿ ￿[1 ￿ F(p;￿;￿)]
n￿1 for all p < rs, then
￿(￿;￿) ￿ ￿(￿;￿) ￿ ￿(1;￿￿) = ￿(1;￿￿):
26Proof. Suppose that the optimal reservation price is given by rs(1;￿￿_ ). We ￿rst consider
the (hardest) case where rs(1;￿￿_ ) < r. Let S￿ ￿ [0;rs(1;￿￿)] denote the subset of
prices for which F(y;1;￿￿) ￿ F(y;￿;￿) and let S> ￿ [0;rs(1;￿￿)] denote the subset of












































































































￿ ￿(￿;￿) ￿ ￿￿(￿;￿)
The ￿rst inequality follows from the fact that: (i) for all y 2 S￿, we have [1 ￿ F(y;1;￿￿)] ￿
[1 ￿ F(y;￿;￿)] and [1 ￿ F(y;1;￿￿)]
n￿1￿￿[1 ￿ F(y;￿;￿)]
n￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ F(y;￿;￿)]
n￿1 ￿
(1 ￿ ￿); (ii) for all y 2 S>, F(y;1;￿￿) ￿ F(y;￿;￿); (iii) since [1 ￿ F(p;1;￿￿)]
n￿1 ￿
￿[1 ￿ F(p;￿;￿)]
n￿1, we must also have:[1 ￿ F(p;1;￿￿)]
i ￿ ￿
i
n [1 ￿ F(p;￿;￿)]
i ￿ ￿[1 ￿ F(p;￿;￿)]
i
for all i ￿ (n￿1) and
￿Pn￿1














The second inequality follows from the fact that rs(1;￿￿) is not the argument that
minimizes the problem ￿(￿;￿). The case where rs(1;￿￿_ ) = r is left since it is a
straightforward simpli￿cation of the above argument.
27In order to complete our proof we need to show that the conditions of Lemma 5 hold for
all cases.
Let Dn(rs;￿;￿) < 1, denote the proportion of non-members that buys from a ￿rm that












￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Dn(rs;￿;￿)
￿
For Cases B, C and D, where ￿f(￿;￿) + ￿ = ￿f(1;￿￿) + ￿￿, we have
[1 ￿ F(p;1;￿￿)]
n￿1 ￿ ￿[1 ￿ F(p;￿;￿)]
n￿1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Dn(rs;￿;￿) ￿ 0:
In Case A, where ￿￿￿ = ￿ we have
[1 ￿ F(p;1;￿￿)]
n￿1 ￿ ￿[1 ￿ F(p;￿;￿)]









This completes our proof.
Proof of proposition 2:






























Note that the function ￿I(￿) is strictly concave in ￿. So the optimal advertising fee when



















































Then for all " ￿ "ns, the search constraint will not be binding and ￿ns will be the optimal
advertising fee.
Proof of Proposition 3:
For all ￿ such that F(r;￿) < 1, as the search cost converges to 0, the reserve price of
















Note that when ￿ = ￿0, we have lim"!0
d￿I(￿)
d￿ = 0. So as " ! 0, the optimal ￿ convergences
to ￿0 = ￿(r)
￿n￿1
n
￿n. In order to complete our proof, we need to show that ￿0 > ￿ns. In










￿=￿ns = 0, which implies by the































































￿ 0, for all n ￿ 2.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Claims 1. to 4. are obvious, we show in the following the results about intermediary




















i=1 [1 ￿ F(rs;￿)]
i ￿R rs
0 q(y)F(y;￿)dy ￿ "
￿
￿















29which is clearly positive.
Proof of Proposition 5;
When the reserve price of non-subscribers is less than r, the change in ￿ has an e⁄ect
on the intermediary￿ s pro￿t that does not exist when search does not matter. An increase
of ￿, for a given "; increases rs, which in turn increase the ￿(￿). So the marginal bene￿t of



















































































(S(pmin(￿)) ￿ S(r) ￿ ") (30)












is positive and decreasing in
















, such that " =
R r












Around ￿￿ an increase of the advertising fee will not change the reserve price of non-
members and pro￿ts of the intermediary will decrease. Conversely, a decrease of the adver-
tising fee below ￿￿ will decrease rs and lower pro￿ts. Hence ￿￿ is truly optimal when the
30search cost is "￿. But this true for all "￿ 2 ("ns;^ "). In all these cases, we have:
UNSub(￿;￿) = S(r) +
Z r
0
q(y)F(y;￿;￿￿)dy ￿ "￿ = S(r)
The change in search cost is o⁄set by an increase in advertising fee and hence average
prices.
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